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INTRODUCTION
1

The government’s sovereign power of eminent domain must
continuously be critiqued to ensure that there is a proper “balance
2
between the public’s need” and the rights of a private property
3
owner. Just compensation, a requirement of an eminent domain
taking, is a major factor in that balance and must be vigilantly
4
enforced. If the government, as the condemning authority, fails to
fully compensate the condemned-property owner for a taking, the
owner of such property will unfairly be responsible for the burden
5
of an eminent domain action that benefits the public. Minnesota’s
eminent domain statute, as amended in 2006, is an attempt to
ensure that this balance is achieved; one piece in achieving this
balance is the minimum-compensation statute, Minnesota Statutes
6
section 117.187. However, in creating this statute, the legislature
failed to provide clear direction in terms of what minimum
compensation actually requires.
In County of Dakota v. Cameron, the Minnesota Supreme Court
provided some clarity by interpreting the meaning of two
undefined, but central, terms in the statute: “community” and
7
“comparable property.” The court’s definitions of these two terms
provide a proper balance between the competing interests of
public taxpayers and condemned-property owners. Although the
minimum-compensation statute was an amendment to Minnesota’s
eminent domain statute, the legislature’s use of unclear language
prevents the court from being able to divert from the common law
and interpret the statute as requiring wide-sweeping changes to
eminent domain actions in Minnesota.

1. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254 (1934).
2. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (quoting
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402
(1949)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654
(1981) (arguing that “[a]s soon as private property has been taken . . . the
landowner has . . . suffered a constitutional violation”).
4. See, e.g., Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 876
(Minn. 2010).
5. John Fee, Reforming Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE:
KELO IN CONTEXT 125, 133 (Dwight H. Merriam et al. eds., 2006).
6. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012).
7. Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron III), 839 N.W.2d 700, 707–08
(Minn. 2013).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/11

2

Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp

2015]

COUNTY OF DAKOTA V. CAMERON

301

This case note begins by providing a brief overview of eminent
domain law before specifically addressing Minnesota Statutes
8
section 117.187. The note then discusses the court’s interpretation
9
of section 117.187 in Cameron. An analysis of the court’s
interpretation of the two disputed terms follows, along with a
discussion of the scope of permissible damages under the
10
minimum-compensation statute. Finally, the note concludes that
the Minnesota Supreme Court properly decided the case before it,
but could have taken its analysis one step further to hold that new
construction is not covered under Minnesota Statutes section
117.187. The note further suggests that if the legislature intended
more significant change to the state’s eminent domain law, it
11
should reevaluate the minimum-compensation statute.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

The Requirement of Just Compensation in Eminent Domain

In the United States, private property has been taken from
12
private owners for public use since the colonial era. However,
compensation for the taking has not always been an essential
13
requirement of a valid exercise of eminent domain. Fear of
14
legislatures and concern for individual rights resulted in a few
states incorporating a just-compensation requirement into their
15
constitutions in the late 1700s. In 1791, the just-compensation
requirement was brought to the federal government through its
inclusion in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; the
author of the Bill of Rights, James Madison, “realized the
significance of national ratification of a compensation
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. Sometimes when an owner failed to develop his or her property, it was
transferred to another person who would use the property to productively aid
development. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 695−96 (1985).
13. Treanor, supra note 12, at 695 (“Eighteenth-century colonial legislatures
regularly took private property without compensating the owner.”).
14. Id. at 706.
15. See id. at 701 (arguing that Vermont’s Constitution of 1777 and
Massachusetts’s Constitution of 1780 “required just compensation for
governmental taking of private property”).
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16

requirement.” Since then, courts have attempted to create a clear
interpretation of what the language of the Fifth Amendment
requires in terms of the scope and permissible damages of an
eminent domain action.
The Fifth Amendment provides that the government may
17
exercise its inherent power of eminent domain, as long as the
taking is for public use and the owner of the condemned property
18
receives just compensation. The Fifth Amendment was originally
intended only to apply to a “direct, physical taking of property by
19
the federal government.” However, it has been interpreted to
have a much broader reach, with clear limitations on
20
compensation. Specifically, the public-use requirement has been
expanded to include actions that merely have an intended purpose
21
of benefitting the public. With such a broad interpretation, the
just-compensation requirement sometimes becomes the only check
22
on a state’s power of eminent domain. This check serves two
related purposes. First, it spreads the burden of government
23
action from just one individual to society as a whole. Second,
it deters the government from excessively exercising its power of
24
eminent domain by making it accountable to the taxpayers.
In interpreting the just-compensation requirement of eminent
domain, the United States Supreme Court has held that just

16.

Id. at 709. James Madison was a “committed defender of property rights.”

Id.
17. Silver v. Ridgeway, 733 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
19. Treanor, supra note 12, at 711.
20. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (holding that
public use includes economic redevelopment); see also United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (holding that just compensation does not
include compensation for the special value of the property to the owner).
21. James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1280 (1985).
22. See id. at 1278 (noting that the just-compensation requirement ensures
that the government properly weighs the costs and benefits of a taking and, thus,
helps prevent the government from inappropriately exercising its power of
eminent domain).
23. See Fee, supra note 5, at 132.
24. See id. at 132–33 (noting that the just-compensation requirement helps
ensure that the government’s use of eminent domain is efficient, as it is an
indicator that the price to the public is greater than the price to compensate every
landowner in full).
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compensation requires the condemned-property owner to be
compensated the “full and exact” monetary equivalent of the taken
25
property. In Olson v. United States, the Court provided that the
property owner is to be put “in as good a position pecuniarily as if
26
his property had not been taken.” However, this principle has
consistently “not been given its full and literal force,” as the Court
has recognized the “practical difficulties in assessing the worth [of]
27
individual places.” With these difficulties in mind, the property’s
fair market value has been found to be the appropriate standard
28
for damages under the just-compensation requirement.
“Fair market value” has been defined as the price a willing
29
buyer would pay a willing seller. Under a fair-market-value
standard, the condemned-property owner is only entitled to
compensation that would make him or her whole and is not to be
left in a better position than if the property had been sold to a
30
private buyer. All costs incurred by the property owner may not be
31
32
adequately measured or fully compensated, but the fair-marketvalue standard provides an objective basis on which to determine
33
compensation.
Although fair market value is the appropriate measure of
34
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the Court has held

25. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
26. 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
27. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 506 (1979).
28. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
(“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”); Olson, 292
U.S. at 255.
29. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
30. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; see also Miller, 317 U.S. at 375–79 (stating that fair
market value neither compensates for the special value of the property to the
owner arising from its special adaptability to his use, nor for the added value
arising from the proposed project).
31. Durham, supra note 21, at 1278–79.
32. Fee, supra note 5, at 133 (providing that, in addition to the loss of the fair
market value of a property, property owners also have relocation costs,
inconvenience, loss of goodwill in a business situation, and personal detachment
from home and community).
33. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979)
(citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374).
34. David L. Callies et al., Is Fair Market Value Just Compensation? An Underlying
Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 137,
149 (Dwight H. Merriam et al. eds., 2006) (citation omitted) (stating that “even
though property value may include attributes that are not transferable,” market

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 11

304

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

that when the fair market value of a property is not easily
ascertainable, or would result in injustice to the condemnedproperty owner, a different standard of valuation may be
35
appropriate. Such other standards require a court to look at the
36
original cost of the property or reproduction costs. If the
government does not fully compensate for a taking, the burden of
an eminent domain action will ultimately “fall selectively upon
37
certain individuals.” On the other hand, if the condemning
authority could not “compel sales at fair market value,” it may be
unable to pursue “large-scale, complex” projects for the public
38
good.
Therefore, the court must always determine a
compensation amount that “is ‘just’ both to an owner whose
39
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill.”
B.

Eminent Domain and Just Compensation in Minnesota

Compensation for an eminent domain action in Minnesota has
a foundation that goes deeper than both the Minnesota and U.S.
Constitutions, as the state’s power to take private property was
40
initially limited by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. This early
41
limitation on the state’s sovereign power of eminent domain was
overridden in 1857 by the adoption of the Minnesota Constitution,
which specifically provides that “[p]rivate property shall not be
taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just
42
compensation therefor, first paid or secured.” Thus, by its
inclusion in the Minnesota Constitution, just compensation for a
price is still appropriate).
35. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
36. See United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396,
403 (1949).
37. Fee, supra note 5, at 133.
38. Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory
of Efficient Governmental Takings, in TAKING PROPERTY AND JUST COMPENSATION: LAW
OF ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 163, 171 (Nicholas Mercuro ed.,
1992).
39. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. at 123.
40. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which governed part of what would
become the state of Minnesota, provided that when “public exigencies make it
necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person’s property . . . full
compensation shall be made for the same.” NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. II.
41. State ex rel. Burnquist v. Flach, 213 Minn. 353, 356, 6 N.W.2d 805, 807
(1942).
42. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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taking has been found to be an absolute right of each citizen, and
no attempt to “‘deprive the citizen of this incontestable right’” is to
43
be tolerated.
44
As a constitutional provision meant to protect citizens and
deter the government from senselessly exercising its power of
45
eminent domain, Minnesota courts have liberally interpreted the
46
just-compensation provision. In Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary
District v. Fitzpatrick, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the
United States Supreme Court’s direction and held that the
property owner is entitled to the “‘full and exact equivalent’” of the
47
property. Once again, this standard is usually determined by the
48
property’s fair market value. However, in Minnesota, the fair
market value is determined by considering any evidence that
“‘would affect the price a purchaser willing but not required to buy
the property would pay an owner willing but not required to sell
49
it.’” The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided that just
compensation is to include “‘all elements of value’” in the property,
50
but is not to exceed a fairly determined market value. The court
has further recognized three general ways of ascertaining the fair
market value of a property: “(1) market data approach based on
comparable sales; (2) income-capitalization approach; and (3)
51
reproduction cost, less depreciation.” Despite the fact that the

43. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 876 (Minn. 2010)
(quoting State ex rel. Ryan v. Dist. Court of Ramsey Cnty., 87 Minn. 146, 151, 91
N.W. 300, 302 (1902)).
44. Id. (“[A] constitutional provision for just compensation was ‘inserted for
the protection of the citizen.’” (quoting Adams v. Chicago, Burlington & N. R.R.
Co., 39 Minn. 286, 290, 39 N.W. 629, 631 (1888))); see also Humphrey v. Strom,
493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992) (“[T]he clear intent of Minnesota law is to fully
compensate its citizens for losses related to property rights incurred because of
state actions.”).
45. Durham, supra note 21, at 1278.
46. See generally Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 878 (adopting an exclusion approach to
just compensation in environmental condemnation proceedings in order to
protect property owners).
47. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. 442, 449, 277
N.W. 394, 398–99 (1937) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
48. Id. (citing Monongahela Nav. Co., 148 U.S. at 326).
49. Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 559).
50. Fitzpatrick, 201 Minn. at 449, 277 N.W. at 398–99 (quoting Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)).
51. Cnty. of Ramsey v. Miller, 316 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Minn. 1982) (citing BEN
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language of the Minnesota Constitution is broader than the U.S.
52
Minnesota courts have limited potentially
Constitution,
53
compensable damages in the same areas as the Supreme Court.
C.

Changes in Eminent Domain as a Result of the Court’s Holding in
Kelo

Both the federal and state power of eminent domain received
great attention and revision after the Supreme Court’s 2005
holding in Kelo v. City of New London that a commercial
redevelopment plan unquestionably served a public purpose and
54
satisfied the public-use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. The
controversy around this decision centered on the Court’s ruling
that it is constitutional to transfer an individual’s private property
55
to private developers. By 2009, forty-three states responded to the
56
widespread public outrage by enacting legislation to curb the
57
58
power of eminent domain. Minnesota was one of these states.
The purpose of the Minnesota amendments can be seen as
providing more protection to the state’s citizens. The chief author
of the eminent domain bill stated that his goal for the bill “was [to]
W. PALMER, PALMER’S MANUAL OF CONDEMNATION LAW § 40 (1961); 4 JULIUS L.
SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3] (rev. 3d ed. 1981)).
52. Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 558.
53. See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Minneapolis v.
Minneapolis Metro. Co., 273 Minn. 256, 263, 141 N.W.2d 130, 136 (1966)
(holding that “enhancement of value resulting from the taking” is not
compensable); see also Strom, 493 N.W.2d at 560–62 (holding “construction-related
interferences” and “loss of visibility to the public traveling” to be evidence in
determining damages and not separate damages).
54. 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
55. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2107 (2009).
56. Id. at 2108 (“[T]he decision was greeted with widespread outrage that cut
across partisan, ideological, racial, and gender lines.”).
57. Id. at 2102.
58. Amendments were made to Minnesota Statutes section 117.025
(Definitions), section 117.027 (Condemnation for Blight Mitigation and
Contamination Remediation), section 117.031 (Attorney Fees), section 117.0412
(Local Government Public Hearing Requirements), section 117.184
(Compensation for Removal of Legal Nonconforming Use), section 117.186
(Compensation for Loss of Going Concern), section 117.187 (Minimum
Compensation), section 117.188 (Limitations), section 117.189 (Public Service
Corporation Exceptions), and section 117.226 (Right of First Refusal). Act of May
19, 2006, ch. 214, 2006 Minn. Laws 195, 195–204.
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limit the use of eminent domain for public use and eliminate the
59
use of eminent domain for economic development.” Part of the
eminent domain amendment that passed in 2006 was the addition
of the minimum-compensation statute, which specifically provides
that:
When an owner must relocate, the amount of damages
payable, at a minimum, must be sufficient for an owner to
purchase a comparable property in the community and not less
than the condemning authority’s payment or deposit
under section 117.042, to the extent that the damages will
not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded
60
to the owner of the property.
However, two pivotal terms within the statute, “comparable
61
property” and “community,” were not defined by the legislature.
Additionally, prior to Cameron, the Minnesota Supreme Court had
62
never interpreted these two terms in relation to section 117.187.
Other post-Kelo Minnesota Supreme Court decisions show that
the court has continued to be rather lenient in its eminent domain
holdings. In terms of the public-use requirement, in State ex rel.
Commissioner of Transportation v. Kettleson, the court held that the
63
requirement was satisfied by a private access road. In terms of
compensation for damages, the appropriate standard continues to
appear to be the fair-market-value standard. In Moorhead Economic
Development Authority v. Anda, the court concluded that when a
contaminated property is condemned, “just compensation will
64
usually be the fair market value of the property as remediated.”
However, although the fair-market-value standard continues to be
used to determine compensation, the court has held that when a
65
statute specifically calls for other factors to be considered,
59. MINN. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, MINNESOTA JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 2006
UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 90 (2006), MN S. Comm. Up., 2006 JUD
(Westlaw).
60. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012) (emphasis added). “Whenever the
petitioner shall require title and possession of all or part of the owner’s property,”
the petitioner “shall pay to the owner or deposit with the court an amount equal
to petitioner’s approved appraisal of value.” Id. § 117.042.
61. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 714 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
62. Id. at 714–15.
63. 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn. 2011).
64. 789 N.W.2d 860, 883 (Minn. 2010).
65. See MINN. STAT. § 216B.47 (“[D]amages to be paid in eminent domain
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meaningful consideration must be given to those statutory factors.
In such a case, the court reasoned that the fair-market-value
standard continues to be significant, as the condemned-property
owner cannot be compensated an amount “less than the full fair
67
market value of his loss.”
III. THE CAMERON DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

On July 25, 2008, the County of Dakota (“County”) exercised
its power of eminent domain to acquire a property for a highway
68
construction project. The condemned property, a commercial
property located in Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota, was a property
on which George C. Cameron owned and operated a liquor
69
business. The condemned property consisted of approximately
70
71
13,000 square feet of land and a building constructed in 1885
that had 4444 square feet of ground level and 1600–2000 square
72
73
feet of basement space. Using a sales comparison approach, the
74
County initially offered Cameron $560,300. Cameron rejected this
offer, and an administrative hearing followed where Cameron was

proceedings must include the original cost of the property less depreciation, loss
of revenue to the utility, expenses resulting from integration of facilities, and
other appropriate factors.”).
66. See City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d
32, 38 (Minn. 2013) (interpreting section 216B.47).
67. Id.
68. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2013).
69. Id. at 703–04.
70. Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron II), 812 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 2013).
71. Id. The district court provided that the condemned property “‘exhibited
wear, tear, and maintenance issues commensurate with its age.’” Id. at 864
(quoting Cnty. of Dakota v. Cameron (Cameron I), No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011
WL 7769947, at *6 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851, aff’d, 839
N.W.2d 700.
72. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 703–04.
73. 3 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21:34 (2014) (“[S]ales of
comparable properties in the area sold at or near the time of taking are examined
in order to ascertain the fair market value of the subject property.”).
74. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 704.
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75

awarded $655,000 in damages. Cameron appealed the award to
76
the Dakota County District Court.
At an evidentiary hearing, Cameron claimed that he was
entitled to minimum compensation under Minnesota Statutes
77
section 117.187. Cameron argued a very narrow interpretation of
the definitions of both “community” and “comparable property,” in
which “community” consisted of the trade area of the business
78
within a three-mile radius of the condemned property. According
to Cameron, there was no “comparable property” within that
community, so he was entitled to an award of damages “that would
allow him to purchase land and construct a new building of
79
comparable size.”
Cameron estimated that minimum
80
compensation would therefore be $2,175,000.
The County, on the other hand, argued that the relevant
81
“community” consisted of the city of Inver Grove Heights. Under
this interpretation, the County argued that a liquor store, “the
Robert Trail property,” qualified as a “comparable property” within
82
the community. The Robert Trail property was significantly
smaller and located seven miles away from the condemned
property, but the County argued that minimum compensation
83
should be based on its June 2008 selling price of $505,000.
The district court ultimately held that “community” should be
defined as a “‘location where a business can survive and be
84
profitable.’” It further provided that the “comparable property”
need neither be available for purchase nor the same size as the
condemned property, but rather, that they should have “‘similar
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 855–56 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839
N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 2013).
81. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 704.
82. Id.
83. The Robert Trail property was sold one month before the County
acquired the condemned property. Id. The Robert Trail property was 3120 square
feet including the basement, compared to the condemned property’s 6200 square
feet including the basement. Cameron I, No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011 WL 7769947,
at *8 n.2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851, aff’d, 839 N.W.2d
700.
84. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 707 (quoting Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at
*4).
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effective age, condition, quality, and parking/landscaping.’” The
district court therefore agreed with the County that the Robert
Trail property was a “comparable property” located within the
86
community. Factoring in the size differences of the buildings, the
district court concluded that Cameron was entitled to $997,055.84
87
in damages.
Cameron appealed, and the district court’s decision was
88
affirmed. In defining “comparable property,” the court of appeals
looked to the sales-comparison approach as it is used in the
valuation of real estate for tax purposes; under this approach, “‘due
weight [is given] to lands which are comparable in character,
89
quality, and location.’” The court then defined “community,”
using the common-usage definition, as “‘[a] group of people living
90
in the same locality and under the same government.’” The court
provided that the district court’s definition of “community”
improperly limited the minimum-compensation statute to
businesses, but concluded that the district court came to the
correct conclusion regarding the comparability of the Robert Trail
91
property.
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
conclusions, but adjusted the definitions of “community” and
92
“comparable property.” Applying a plain meaning approach to
the words in the statute, the majority held that “community” means
“an identifiable locality that has a socially or governmentally
93
recognized identity, or a group of such localities.” The court
reasoned that this definition was consistent with the definition of
85. Id. at 704 (quoting Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *6).
86. Id. at 707–08 (citing Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *7).
87. Id. at 704–05 (citing Cameron I, 2011 WL 7769947, at *8).
88. Id. at 705.
89. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 273.12 (2010)), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700.
90. Id. at 860 (alteration in original) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 383 (3d ed. 1992)).
91. Id.
92. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–10. The court also analyzed the
appropriate determination of attorney’s fees under Minnesota Statutes section
117.031(a), but that aspect of the court’s opinion is not discussed in this note. Id.
at 710–12.
93. Id. at 706–07.
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94

the term in other Minnesota statutes. Thus, under this definition
of “community,” the court found that the city of Inver Grove
95
Heights qualified as an appropriate community.
96
Using a technical interpretation, the court concluded that a
“comparable property” is “an existing property—regardless of its
availability for purchase—that has enough like characteristics or
qualities to another property that the value of one can be used to
97
determine the value of the other.” The court reasoned that a
“functional[ly] equivalent” property was not a necessary
98
requirement for minimum compensation, and the property need
99
not be “contemporaneously available for purchase.” Under the
court’s definition, the Robert Trail property qualified as a
100
“comparable property within the community.” Therefore, the
court affirmed Cameron’s award of damages in the amount of
101
$997,055.84.
In a concurrence and dissent, Justice Anderson agreed with
the court’s result but disagreed with the majority’s definition of
102
“community.”
Justice Anderson argued that the definition
announced by the court had its own problems, as the phrase
“socially or governmentally recognized identity” is just as hard to
103
define as “community.”
He further pointed out that the
definition advanced by the majority could result in many situations
104
that would not fit within the definition. As a result of potential
94. Id. at 707. One statute, for example, defines community as “an
identifiable local neighborhood, community, rural district, or other geographically
well-defined area in which individuals have common interests or interact.” MINN.
STAT. § 52.001, subdiv. 5 (2012).
95. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 707–08.
96. Id. at 709.
97. Id. at 710.
98. Id. at 709 (“While functional equivalence may be relevant to the
determination of whether a property qualifies as ‘comparable,’ it is not a necessary
requirement.”).
99. Id. (“We are not aware of any technical definition of the phrase
‘comparable property’ that requires a property also to be contemporaneously
available for purchase.”).
100. Id. at 708. Important factors to consider in determining if a property is
comparable include “effective age, condition, quality, and parking/landscaping,”
as well as location and similar uses of the properties. Id.
101. Id. at 712.
102. Id. (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 714–15.
104. Id. at 715 (providing examples such as “a very small city, with no
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problems that could arise in the future, Justice Anderson argued
105
that defining “community” should be left to the legislature.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretation of Minnesota
Statutes section 117.187 provided valid definitions for the two
disputed terms: “community” and “comparable property.”
However, the statutory interpretation and analyses employed by the
court in reaching those definitions was incomplete. Additionally,
the court failed to fully answer the question of permissible damages
under the minimum-compensation statute when there is no
106
“comparable property in the community.”
The objective of statutory interpretation is for the court to
107
determine the legislature’s intent in enacting a statute. When the
statutory language has a clear meaning, “that meaning governs
108
application of that statute.” Therefore, when the legislature’s
intent is clear and unambiguous, with only one reasonable
interpretation of a term, the court must use the plain meaning
109
approach to statutory interpretation. On the other hand, when
the legislature’s intent is ambiguous, such intent must be
110
ascertained through canons of construction. Only after all aspects

comparable properties, or the reverse, a large metropolitan area composed of
many different ‘communities’ with vigorous disagreement about what
‘community’ means”).
105. Id.
106. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012).
107. Id. § 645.16.
108. Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2007) (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (2006)).
109. See Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 2010) (citing Tuma v.
Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986)); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 645.08(1) (2012) (“Words and phrases are construed according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage.”).
110. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (2008)). Matters to consider to ascertain the legislature’s intent
include:
(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the circumstances under
which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to
be attained; (5) the former law, if any, including other laws upon the
same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular
interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and (8)
legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.
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surrounding the eminent domain statute are fully considered will
111
the legislature’s intention be effectuated, and the definitions and
conclusions reached by the court provide accurate context for
112
compensation in future eminent domain cases.
A.

Definition of “Community” in Minnesota Statutes Section 117.187

Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 provides that, in an
eminent domain proceeding, the property owner is entitled to
compensation that would allow him or her to purchase a
113
“comparable property in the community.” The definition of
“community” in this statute is crucial in providing a framework for
determining how broadly or narrowly this statute is to be read, and
thus, to the scope of permissible damages under the justcompensation requirement in Minnesota. Throughout the
proceedings, there were a number of different interpretations of
“community” presented; therefore, the Cameron court erred by
simply applying the plain meaning approach in its interpretation of
the term. Irrespective of this error, the court’s definition appears to
be consistent with an ascertained legislative intent based on an
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment,
prior versions of the bill, and the legislature’s definition of the
term in other statutes.
1.

“Community” Is an Ambiguous Term Within the Statute

A term is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one
114
“reasonable interpretation.”
In the course of the Cameron

MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012).
111. See State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166
(Minn. 2011) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010); In re 2010 Gubernatorial
Election, 793 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2010)).
112. See generally Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998)
(“‘Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory
interpretation . . . .’” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
172–73 (1989))).
113. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012).
114. State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011) (“‘A statute is only
ambiguous when the language therein is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.’” (quoting Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384
(Minn. 1999))). Compare Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 363 (competing interpretations
brought into focus the ambiguity of the statute), with McLane Minn., Inc. v.
Comm’r of Revenue, 773 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2009) (competing
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proceedings, multiple interpretations of “community” were
presented; these definitions included: (1) a trade area of
115
116
business, (2) a city, (3) “a location where a business can survive
117
and be profitable,” and (4) “[a] group of people living in the
118
same locality and under the same government.” Therefore, the
term “community” is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation and is ambiguous as it appears within section
117.187. Because “community” is an ambiguous term, the court
should have tried to ascertain the legislature’s intent by looking
119
beyond the plain meaning of the word and considering “the
object to be obtained by the law, prior versions of the law, and the
120
circumstances surrounding the law’s enactment.”
The 2006 amendments to Minnesota’s eminent domain
statute, including section 117.187, were a legislative response to the
United States Supreme Court’s very broad interpretation of the
121
public-use requirement in Kelo. If the minimum-compensation
statute is to be seen as narrowing that reach, it could be argued that
this section should also broaden permissible compensation.
However, this interpretation would be inaccurate, as the “measure
interpretation was unreasonable based on the language of the statute, therefore
rendering the statute unambiguous).
115. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Minn. 2013). Cameron testified that
the trade area of his business was an area within three miles of the condemned
property. Id.
116. Id. The County’s expert testified that the city of Inver Grove Heights
could qualify as the relevant community. Id.
117. Cameron I, No. 19-HA-CV-09-3756, 2011 WL 7769947, at *4 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 23, 2011), aff’d, 812 N.W.2d 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d
700.
118. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d at 860 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 90), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d 700. “[I]n a smaller
municipality, the municipality may be the community. But if the property is
located in a large metropolitan area, the community may be a neighborhood or
geographic area within the metropolis.” Id.
119. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012); Staab v. Diocese of Saint Cloud, 813
N.W.2d 68, 77 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that legislative intent should be
examined when a statute is open to more than one reasonable interpretation);
Leathers, 799 N.W.2d at 611 (“When a statutory provision is ambiguous, it is
appropriate to turn to the canons of statutory construction to ascertain a statute’s
meaning.”).
120. State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Minn.
2011) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)); In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election, 793
N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2010)).
121. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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of compensation” was not an issue before the Supreme Court in
Kelo—no argument was made regarding this element of an eminent
122
domain action. In reaching its holding regarding the public-use
requirement, the Supreme Court expressly provided that states may
place further restrictions on the exercise of eminent domain within
123
its boundaries. Consistent with this holding, Minnesota’s 2006
amendments can be seen as specifically addressing the public-use
requirement. This interpretation is supported by statements made
by Senator Thomas Bakk, the chief author of the amendments, that
his goal was to “stop the use of eminent domain for economic
development purposes” with “[t]he heart of the bill [being]
124
provisions defining public uses or public purposes.”
Therefore, the amendments should be interpreted as merely
intending to provide greater protection to property owners whose
125
property is being taken for private use.
The scope of the
126
minimum-compensation statute is not limited to such situations.
Consequently, the circumstances in which the minimum127
compensation statute was enacted do not provide any clear
insight into how this aspect of the amendment should be

122. Oral Argument at 50:52, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_04_108 (last visited Dec. 7,
2014). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue of just
compensation was not before the Court, in oral argument, Justice Breyer phrased
the question in terms of putting “the person in the position he would be in if he
didn’t have to sell his house.” Id. at 49:54. And Justice Souter stated that the
problem that “bothers a lot of us” is the problem of making the “property owner
whole.” Id. at 50:45.
123. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
124. MINN. SENATE COMM. ON TRANSP., MINNESOTA TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE 2006 UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 27 (2006), MN S. Comm.
Up., 2006 TRP (Westlaw) (follow hyperlink dated “March 31, 2006”).
125. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (“We emphasize that nothing in our
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the
takings power.”); Staab v. Diocese of Saint Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2012)
(citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010)) (noting that if statutory language is
ambiguous, “the court may look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the
Legislature’s intent”).
126. Compare MINN. STAT. § 117.012, subdiv. 2 (2012) (“Eminent domain may
only be used for a public use or public purpose.”), with id. § 117.187 (“When an
owner must relocate, the amount of damages payable, at a minimum, must be
sufficient for an owner to purchase a comparable property in the community
. . . .”).
127. Id. § 645.16.
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interpreted in terms of the intended scope of the definition of
“community” for just compensation.
A prior version of Minnesota’s eminent domain bill, on the
other hand, provides a more accurate context in which to interpret
128
the legislature’s intent with regard to section 117.187.
The
original version of the bill provided that minimum-compensation
should be determined based on a “similar sized house or
129
building.”
The legislature ultimately decided to change this
130
wording to “comparable property.” This change demonstrates a
clear intent on the part of the legislature to broaden the scope of
what is evaluated when considering permissible potential
131
properties for valuation. In order to fully satisfy that intent and
include more properties for valuation purposes, a broad
132
reading of “community” would be required as well.
That the legislature intended a broad definition of
“community” is further supported by the legislature’s definition of
the term in other contexts. In Minnesota Statutes section
133
256.9754,
the legislature defined “community” as “a town,
township, city, or targeted neighborhood within a city, or a
consortium of towns, townships, cities, or targeted neighborhoods
134
135
within cities.”
Another statute, section 52.001,
defines
community as an “identifiable local neighborhood, community,

128. See generally Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 77 (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2010))
(reviewing earlier versions of a statute to determine legislative intent after
concluding a statute was ambiguous).
129. See MINN. SENATE COMM. ON TRANSP., MINNESOTA TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE 2006 UPDATE, S. 84-2006, Reg. Sess., para. 33 (2006), MN S. Comm.
Up., 2006 TRP (Westlaw) (follow hyperlink dated “March 31, 2006”); MINN.
SENATE, MINNESOTA SENATE JOURNAL, S. 84-75, Reg. Sess. (2006), MN S. Jour., 2006
Reg. Sess. No. 79 (Westlaw) (“Page 9, line 26, delete ‘a similar house or building of
equivalent size.’” (emphasis omitted)).
130. MINN. SENATE, MINNESOTA SENATE JOURNAL, S. 84-79, Reg. Sess. (2006),
MN S. Jour., 2006 Reg. Sess. No. 79 (Westlaw) (“Page 10, line 31, after ‘purchase’
insert ‘a comparable property . . . .’” (emphasis omitted).
131. See generally Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry, 749 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Minn.
2008) (viewing the adoption of an amendment as evidence that the legislature
wanted to change the law).
132. See McLane Minn., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 773 N.W.2d 289, 297
(Minn. 2009) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2008)) (looking at the entire section
as a whole and giving “effect to all of its provisions”).
133. MINN. STAT. § 256.9754 (2012).
134. Id. § 256.9754, subdiv. 1(a).
135. Id. § 52.001 (definitions for credit union banking).
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rural district, or other geographically well-defined area in which
136
individuals have common interests or interact.” Both of these
definitions for community focus on physical locality, as opposed to
a social construction, and allow for broad applicability of the
137
statute. Therefore, based on the specific language chosen by the
legislature in section 117.187, it can be inferred that the legislature
intended such broadness to be applied to the definition of
“community” in the minimum-compensation statute as well.
2.

The Court’s Definition of “Community”

Understanding that the legislature intended a broad definition
of “community” focused on physical locality, each proposed
definition throughout the lower court proceedings of Cameron must
138
be rendered null. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s majority
definition of “community” as “an identifiable locality that has a
socially or governmentally recognized identity, or a group of
139
such localities,” on the other hand, does properly provide a broad
definition based on physical locality that extends beyond
commercial properties. Although the majority’s definition may not
136. Id.
137. Cf. id. § 144.1476 (defining “eligible rural community” as “(1) a
Minnesota community that is located in a rural area, as defined in the federal
Medicare regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, section 405.1041; or
(2) a Minnesota community that has a population of less than 10,000, according to
the United States Bureau of Statistics, and that is outside the seven-county
metropolitan area, excluding the cities of Duluth, Mankato, Moorhead, Rochester,
and St. Cloud”); id. § 626.91 (defining “community” as “the Lower Sioux Indian
Community”).
138. Cameron’s proposed definition is restricted to a “[three] mile trade
area.” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 706 (Minn. 2013). This clearly goes against the
broad legislative intent; such a narrow definition creates a nearly unattainable
standard for a “comparable property in the community.” MINN. STAT. § 117.187.
The County proposed a definition that included the “city or town [of] the
condemned property,” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706, but this improperly
excludes all properties outside the city’s boundaries regardless of the property’s
use. The district court’s definition as “a location where a business can survive and
be profitable,” id. at 707, inappropriately limits the applicability of the statute to
commercial property. The definition based on the “plain and ordinary meaning,”
advanced by the Minnesota Court of Appeals as a “group of people living in the
same locality and under the same government,” id. at 706, goes against the
legislature’s ascertained intent to define “community” based on physical locality as
opposed to a social construction.
139. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–07.
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140

be perfect, the definition clarifies the intended “sense of the
141
term” and creates a context in which the statute is to be read. A
definition that tries to address every potential situation risks the
possibility of becoming so long and convoluted that it becomes
142
difficult to understand. Therefore, the definition of “community”
advanced by the majority is an appropriate standard for application
of Minnesota’s eminent domain statute. However, as Justice
Anderson concluded in his concurrence and dissent, it may be
advantageous for the legislature to reevaluate this statute to more
clearly define what is intended by “community,” specifically in the
143
context of minimum compensation.
B.

Definition of “Comparable Property” in Minnesota Statutes Section
117.187

The definition of “comparable property” in section 117.187 is
the second determinative element in evaluating the framework for
the scope of potential damages owed to condemned-property
144
owners in an eminent domain action.
Throughout the
proceedings, the courts presented one basic interpretation of
“comparable property”; however, Cameron argued that there were
two additional requirements implied in the phrase: functional
equivalence and availability. After evaluating these requirements
based on the language of the statute, the court correctly
determined that the suggested requirements were unreasonable
145
and that the statute was unambiguous.
1.

“Comparable Property” Is an Unambiguous Term in the Statute

In the course of the Cameron proceedings, “comparable
property” was defined as being similar in regards to the property’s
140. Id. at 715 (Anderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing
that “socially or governmentally recognized identity” is a phrase no better defined
than “community”).
141. Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 999, 1014 (2013).
142. See id. at 1052–53.
143. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 715.
144. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012).
145. The court concluded that, “[w]hile functional equivalence may be
relevant to the determination of whether a property qualifies as ‘comparable,’ it is
not a necessary requirement.” Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 709. Further, requiring
the property to be available would go against real-estate valuation principles. Id.
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146

character, quality, location, and age. Cameron argued that the
definition of comparable property required two additional
147
elements: functional equivalence and availability. However, even
with alternative interpretations, the language is only unambiguous
when such interpretations are reasonable. The question then is
what makes an interpretation reasonable. Insight into the answer
can be gleaned from a Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision that
stated, “An interpretation [of a statute] is unreasonable [when the
interpretation] ‘directly contravenes the words of the statute, it is
clearly contrary to legislative intent or it is without rational
148
basis.’” Interpreting section 117.187 as requiring a comparable
property to be both a functional equivalent and available
for purchase would improperly go against the plain language in the
149
Therefore, the court correctly
eminent domain statute.
determined that the phrase “comparable property” was
unambiguous, as there was no reasonable alternative interpretation
150
of the term presented.
First, it would be unreasonable to conclude that “comparable
property” requires a functionally equivalent property, as this
interpretation would contradict the plain language of the statute.
When engaging in statutory interpretation, phrases are to be
interpreted in accordance with their “common and approved
151
usage.”
The plain language chosen by the legislature
146. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d
700.
147. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 708–09 (majority opinion).
148. Berry v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 570 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1997) (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 539
N.W.2d 98, 103 (Wis. 1995)).
149. See generally MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012) (“When the words of a law in
their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the
spirit.”).
150. Id.; see also Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 829 N.W.2d 53, 57
(Minn. 2013) (“A statute that is not reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation is not ambiguous.” (citing City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 800
N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011))); McLane Minn., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 773
N.W.2d 289, 297 (Minn. 2009); Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870
(Minn. 2006) (“This court will not look beyond the plain language of the statute if
the words of the statute are ‘clear and free from all ambiguity.’” (quoting
Olmanson v. LeSueur Cnty., 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2005))).
151. MINN. STAT. § 645.08, subdiv. 1 (“[W]ords and phrases are construed
according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved
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consequently establishes that functional equivalence was not
intended in the definition of “comparable property,” as such an
interpretation changes the plain meaning of the chosen words. A
functionally equivalent property would require the comparable
152
property to be “virtually identical.”
However, the word
153
“comparable” merely denotes “a similar piece of property.”
“Functional equivalent” is simply a much higher standard of
comparability than the legislature’s language requires. Requiring
that a comparable property be a functional equivalent would
154
improperly stretch the phrase “far beyond its common meaning”
155
and add words that are not there, ultimately contradicting the
156
language of the statute. Thus, there is no indication based on the
language of the statute that the legislature intended “comparable
property” to require more than a property with similar
157
characteristics to the property at issue.
Second, it would also be unreasonable to interpret the statute
158
as requiring the property to be available for purchase. Although
the Cameron court reached the correct conclusion regarding this
issue, its analysis was once again lacking—the court improperly
reasoned, based purely on the technical definition of comparable
property in the “analogous context of tax assessment of real
property,” that a property need not be contemporaneously
159
available. This line of reasoning alone is insufficient to support
the court’s conclusion, as valuation for tax purposes is not used to
160
determine the property’s “true or market value,” which is the

usage . . . .”).
152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “equivalent”).
153. Id. at 340 (defining “comparable”).
154. See generally Kirkwold Const. Co. v. M.G.A. Const., Inc., 513 N.W.2d 241,
244 (Minn. 1994) (analyzing the importance of interpreting plain language).
155. See generally Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d
596, 600 (Minn. 2012) (“We ‘will not read into a statute a provision that the
legislature has omitted, either purposely or inadvertently.’” (quoting Reiter v.
Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006))).
156. See Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Minn. 2001).
157. See generally Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531,
549 (1987) (“Nothing in the language or structure of [the statute] compels the
conclusion that ‘in Alaska’ means something other than ‘in the State of Alaska.’”).
158. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 709 (Minn. 2013).
159. Id.
160. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Valuation for Taxation Purposes as Admissible to
Show Value for Other Purposes, 39 A.L.R.2d 209 (1955).
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goal of valuation for an eminent domain action. A property’s
value for tax purposes has, therefore, been held not to be “relevant
162
to the question of that same property’s market value.” The same
differences that make tax assessments irrelevant in eminent domain
cases require an independent analysis of whether a property must
163
be available in the context of eminent domain.
In addressing this issue, the court should have looked at the
requirement of availability in terms of the fair-market-value
164
standard. When evaluating a property under the fair-market-value
standard, the determination of a property’s value does not require
165
an actual purchaser willing to purchase a property. The fairmarket-value standard merely requires the determination of a value
that “in all probability” would have been arrived at through
166
negotiation.
The question to satisfy this requirement is not
whether the property is readily available, but rather, what would a
willing purchaser pay if the property were for sale.
In trying to ascertain the legislature’s intent, it is also
important to consider “the consequences of a particular
167
interpretation.”
In this case, interpreting Minnesota Statutes
section 117.187 as requiring a property to be available for purchase
would improperly affect other provisions of the 2006 amendments
to the eminent domain statute. For example, section 117.186
168
provides for compensation for loss of going concern. This statute
states:
161. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470, 474 (1973) (“The owner is entitled to the fair market value of his property at
the time of the taking.”).
162. EOP-Nicollet Mall, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 723 N.W.2d 270, 283
(Minn. 2006); see also Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 882
(Minn. 2010) (“[I]n a tax court proceeding, the admission of contamination
evidence does not raise the same constitutional concerns of due process and just
compensation that it does in a condemnation proceeding.”).
163. See Cont’l Retail, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 801 N.W.2d 395, 402
(Minn. 2011) (providing that, in the tax context, the sales comparison approach is
“based on the price paid in actual market transactions of comparable properties”
(citing Kmart Corp. v. Cnty. of Becker, 709 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. 2006))).
164. See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the fair-market-value standard
continued as the valuation standard).
165. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
166. Id.
167. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012).
168. Id. § 117.186, subdiv. 2. A going concern is the “benefit[] that accrue[s]
to a business or trade as a result of its location, reputation for dependability, skill
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If a business or trade is destroyed by a taking, the owner
shall be compensated for loss of going concern, unless . . .
the loss can be reasonably prevented by relocating the
business or trade in the same or a similar and reasonably
169
suitable location as the property that was taken . . . .
If section 117.187 were interpreted as requiring a property to be
available, it would follow that a property would also need to be
available under section 117.186, and there would never be a need
to “compensate for loss of going concern” as the loss would always
be preventable through business relocation. Therefore, an
interpretation requiring property availability is thus unreasonable
as it would improperly result in an invalidation of section 117.186.
Another section of the statute, section 117.188, further
provides that “[t]he condemning authority must not require the
owner to accept as part of the compensation due any substitute or
170
replacement property.”
If the condemning authority cannot
require the condemned-property owner to accept an available
property, it does not make sense to interpret section 117.187 as
171
requiring the condemning authority to provide such property.
Interpreting section 117.187 as requiring the property to be
available would drastically limit, hamper, and unduly complicate
eminent domain proceedings by entangling them into a real estate
process. The legislature simply cannot guarantee that an actual
purchase of property will happen. The focus of the proceedings
172
would switch from a monetary award to a property award. Based
on the language used in the statute, there is no indication that the
legislature intended this result. Therefore, the court correctly
determined that there was no reasonable alternative definition, and
“comparable property” was an unambiguous phrase within section
173
117.187.

or quality, customer base, good will, or any other circumstances resulting in the
probable retention of old or acquisition of new patronage.” Id. § 117.186, subdiv.
1(1).
169. Id. § 117.186, subdiv. 2(2).
170. Id. § 117.188.
171. See Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 2007) (“[E]very law
shall be construed to give effect to all its provisions . . . .” (citing MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (2006))).
172. See Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 710 (Minn. 2013).
173. See id. at 709.
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Definition of “Comparable Property”

As an unambiguous term, “comparable property” would be
subject to the plain meaning approach of statutory
174
175
interpretation, unless it were a technical word or phrase, in
which case a definition based on the acquired technical meaning of
176
the term would be required. Here, the phrase “comparable
property” is neither technical nor has it acquired a special
meaning. Therefore, the court improperly provided a technical
definition when it should have applied the plain meaning
approach.
Irrespective of this error, the definition reached by the court
provides an adequate definition for comparable property as “a
piece of property that has enough like characteristics and qualities
to another piece of property that the value of one can be used to
177
determine the value of the other.” This definition is consistent
with the dictionary definition of “comparable,” which is defined as
“[a] piece of property used as a comparison to determine the value
178
of a similar piece of property.” When applying this definition,
additional factors to consider include: “land size, features, and
location; the square footage, age, design, and construction quality
of any structures on the land; as well as features related to the
179
property’s usage.”

174. The legislature’s intent can be discerned from the “plain and
unambiguous language” of the statute. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636
N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001) (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2000) and Ed
Herman & Sons v. Russell, 535 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1995)).
175. MINN. STAT. § 645.08 (2012).
176. See generally Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 829 N.W.2d 53, 57
(Minn. 2013) (citing Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn.
2012)) (stating that, when technical words and phrases are involved, such
language must be defined based on their “special meaning”).
177. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 708. Characteristics and qualities may include
“location, use, physical features, economic attributes, financing terms, conditions
of sale, market conditions, and legal characteristics such as zoning and other
restrictions.” Id. at 708 n.2 (citing APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE
141 (13th ed. 2008)).
178. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 152, at 340.
179. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 839 N.W.2d
700.
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Damages Based on Fair Market Value in Minnesota Statutes Section
117.187

A thorough reading of Minnesota Statutes section 117.187, in
light of the surrounding sections, indicates that the legislature
intended the fair-market-value standard to continue to be the
appropriate measure of damages for eminent domain proceedings.
The fair market value is the appropriate standard under common
180
law;
the standard would only change if there was a clear
181
indication from the legislature that such change was intended.
Based on the language of section 117.187, there is no such
indication here. Instead, this statutory language indicates that the
legislature simply intended to switch the property valued under the
fair-market-value standard from the traditional condemned
182
property to the comparable property.
The underlying theory of compensation provides that the
183
property owner must be made whole for the taking. When there
is a comparable property within the community, being made whole
under section 117.187 would be satisfied by providing the property
owner with sufficient monetary compensation to be able to
184
purchase a property similar to the one lost. According to the
court, such was the case in Cameron, and compensation based on
the sale of the Robert Trail property was an appropriate property
185
on which to base damages.
However, had the court determined that the Robert Trail
property was not a “comparable property within the community,”
the court would have faced the question of whether just
compensation under the minimum-compensation statute would

180. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
(“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”); Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
181. See Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 75 (providing that the legislature could have
expressly limited the definition of “persons” if that is what it intended); Premier
Bank v. Becker Dev., L.L.C., 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010) (reasoning that
rules of statutory interpretation “‘forbid adding words or meaning to a statute’”)
(quoting Genin v. 1996 Mercury Marquis, 622 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Minn. 2001))).
182. Cameron II, 812 N.W.2d at 861; Brief of Amicus Curiae League of
Minnesota Cities at 13, Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700 (No. A11-1273), 2012 WL
10020704.
183. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
184. MINN. STAT. § 117.187 (2012).
185. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 710.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/11

26

Williams: Property Law: Limited Compensation Under Minnesota's Minimum-Comp

2015]

COUNTY OF DAKOTA V. CAMERON

325

186

include the costs for new construction.
The answer to this
question provides the final element of the scope of section 117.187.
Absent a comparable property from which appropriate
compensation would be determined, other valuation methods
would need to be applied. Courts have “occasionally used the cost
187
of replacement as an alternative to fair market value.”
Compensation based on the replacement-cost standard would
entitle the condemned-property owner to receive compensation for
the “cost to construct a building with an equivalent utility to the
building being appraised, at current prices, using modern
188
In order for the
materials, standards, design and layout.”
replacement-cost standard to apply to just-compensation damages,
189
a strict standard should be met. This standard would require
the court to carefully consider the line between making the
190
property owner whole and providing him or her with a windfall.
If the strict standard is met, the property owner may be entitled to
191
compensation that covers the cost of replacement. However, it
has been argued that compensation based on replacement costs
should consider “physical ‘wear and tear’ and economic and
192
functional obsolescence.” Therefore, it can be inferred that while

186. See id. at 704 (arguing that “in the absence of a comparable property
available for purchase, he was entitled to compensation that would allow him to
purchase land and construct a new building of comparable size and quality”).
187. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 702 (2005). Replacement value is used
when: (1) the market value is not readily available, (2) there are extremely high
compensable consequential damages, or (3) the fair market value results in
manifest injustice. Id. at 702–03.
188. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Cnty. of Carver, 573 N.W.2d 651, 660
(Minn. 1998).
189. See Case Comment, “Substitute Facilities” Compensation for Private
Condemnees: United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 92 HARV. L. REV. 514, 523
(1978).
190. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984)
(reasoning that “any increase in the quality of the facility may be as readily
characterized as a ‘windfall’ as the award of cash proceeds for a substitute facility
that is never built”); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1493 (1999)
(explaining that one person’s windfall is another person’s loss).
191. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 573 N.W.2d at 660.
192. State by Lord v. Red Wing Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 92 N.W.2d 206,
209 (Minn. 1958); see also Lewis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 623 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn.
2001) (reasoning that appraisers “discounted the building replacement cost” in a
valuation proceeding to account for “functional obsolescence”).
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Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 would not fully cover the cost of
new construction, it perhaps would permit compensation to
remodel a property in the “community” into a comparable
property.
This limited interpretation of replacement-cost compensation
is founded on the basic principles behind the fair-market-value and
just-compensation requirements. Regardless of the valuation
method employed, just compensation does not require the
“condemning authority [to] pay more than the market value of the
193
property.” In United States v. 50 Acres of Land, the United States
Supreme Court specifically rejected compensation for a
replacement facility, as “any increase in the quality of the facility
may be readily characterized as a ‘windfall,’” and creating a
formula to reduce such possibility “would enhance the risk of error
194
and prejudice.” In a free market, a property owner would not
receive the full amount that it would cost the buyer to purchase the
property and build a new structure on it; the property owner would
receive the value of the property, and the buyer would incur
additional costs to construct the building. Providing a condemnedproperty owner with full new construction compensation would
allow the property owner to have an old building replaced with a
195
brand new and more valuable building, paid for at the expense of
196
In such situations, the property owner would
public funds.
197
receive damages that would far exceed his or her actual loss,
198
which would go against basic principles of fairness and the
199
general understanding that the public interest outweighs the

193. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 897 (Minn. 2010)
(Dietzen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
194. 469 U.S. at 34–36.
195. See id. at 34 (arguing that “[i]f the replacement facility is more costly than
the condemned facility, it presumably is more valuable”).
196. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (reasoning
that the burden should “be spread among taxpayers through the payment of
compensation”).
197. See Kades, supra note 190, at 1559 (“Paying anything more than market
value price would result in windfalls for those lucky enough to own property
needed for public projects . . . .”)
198. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124
(1950).
199. See generally Serkin, supra note 187, at 706–08 (“The government would
come to a standstill if required to compensate for every harm it imposed.”).
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200

private interest. Interpreting the amendment as fully covering the
cost of new construction would thus produce an absurd and unjust
result, contradicting an important principle of statutory
201
interpretation. In the end, such unrealistically high damages
could prevent the government from exercising its power of
eminent domain, even when it would be in the public’s best
202
interest.
Therefore, when there is no “comparable property within the
community,” damages under Minnesota Statues section 117.187
should be based on a reproduction-cost standard minus
depreciation. In the end, valuation involves the exercise of
203
judgment. It would not be unreasonable for such judgment to
determine that when the situation involves a property where fair
market value cannot be ascertained, the replacement-cost standard
may be applied. Had the legislature intended to significantly
modify the structure of compensation to include the cost of new
construction, such instruction would have been clearly indicated in
204
the amendment’s language.
D.

Effect of the Cameron Decision on Eminent Domain

Not only did the Cameron court determine damages based on a
fair-market-value standard, but the court left unanswered the
question of “whether the minimum-compensation statute permits
an upward or downward adjustment from the value of the
comparable property” to factor in differences between the
205
It can be inferred from the court’s statement
properties.
regarding this aspect of damages that, had the damages been
challenged by the state, the court may not have awarded such

200. MINN. STAT. § 645.17(5) (2012).
201. See Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Minn. 2000)
(citing Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n, 259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 N.W.2d 434,
441 (1961)).
202. See generally Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New
London: Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165, 176–
77 (2006) (“A government project furthered by the use of eminent domain must
be more valuable than the compensation due in order for the use of eminent
domain to make economic sense.”).
203. 4 SACKMAN ET AL., supra note 51, § 12.01.
204. See generally United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121,
123 (1950) (“Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard.”).
205. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d 700, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2013).
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adjustments. This element of the opinion brings to light the hard
stance that the court is taking regarding permissible compensation
in eminent domain proceedings. Consequently, even though there
206
were changes to eminent domain law as a result of Kelo, the
reality that Cameron seems to establish is that the amendments may
207
actually have resulted in very minimal actual change. If real
change was intended by the legislature, such change should have
been clearly shown by: (1) stating the purpose of the statute, (2)
describing the intended remedy, and (3) providing a clear path for
how that remedy should be achieved. Without clear language that
208
such change is intended, no real change will occur, as courts will
continue to be required to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis
209
“in order that there might be stability in the law.”
If the
legislature intends a more limited interpretation of permissible
comparable properties or broader interpretation of compensable
damages, it should reevaluate the statute and clearly articulate its
intended application.
V. CONCLUSION
The court’s interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section
117.187 can be seen as being pro-condemning authority. The court
provided a broad definition of both “community” and “comparable
210
property,” permitting a greater range of permissible properties to
be included in the determination of just compensation in an
eminent domain action. This decision can be seen as a pushback to
the post-Kelo public outrage. If the legislature had intended the
minimum-compensation statute to significantly change the
structure of just compensation under eminent domain, such intent
would have been clearly reflected in the statute.

206. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
207. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 713 (Anderson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“But if the Legislature intended to increase compensation to
displaced property owners, then I fear that Minn. Stat. § 117.187 fails to provide
courts with sufficient guidance to achieve that aim.”).
208. See generally State ex rel. Comm’r of Transp. v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160,
165 (Minn. 2011) (“Nothing in [the statute] disturbs the long-standing principle
of deference by the courts to the Commissioner’s legislative decision-making in
condemning private property to build highways.”).
209. Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted).
210. Cameron III, 839 N.W.2d at 706–710.
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Therefore, the court in Cameron ultimately established
appropriate and valid definitions for both “comparable property”
211
and “community.” Additionally, the court correctly held that
Minnesota Statutes section 117.187 does not include compensation
for replacement-cost damages in an eminent domain proceeding
212
where there is a comparable property within the community.
However, the court could have taken its analysis one step further
and established that, in Minnesota, eminent domain damages will
not include new construction, even in the absence of a comparable
property in the community. In a case where the fair-market-value
standard cannot be applied, reduced replacement costs may
provide appropriate compensation.

211.
212.

Id.
Id.
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